

**PANTEX SEC PETITION REVIEW:  
1951-1958, 1984-1991**

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## **SC&A Recommendation: W-28 DU Exposure**

- **SC&A found that 1990 urinalysis results from W-28 disassembly contamination event would not be necessarily bounding of all prior worker exposure, as indicated in NIOSH's ER for SEC petition 00068.**
  - No objective evidence available from air sampling, contamination surveys
  - No approach presented to normalize operational differences over 32 years
  - Reliance on purportedly strong contamination control program not backed up by 1989 DOE audit findings
  - Exposures not necessarily confined to W-28 handlers due to contamination track out
- **Advisory Board agreed and recommended SEC class for all Pantex workers for 1958-1983 (meeting standard SEC criteria)**
- **Action was deferred on earlier (1951-1957) and later (1984-1991) SEC periods, pending further review by SC&A and NIOSH, respectively.**

## **SC&A Review, 1951-1957**

- **Work group tasked SC&A with reviewing time period prior to W-28 handling at Pantex to ascertain any analogous exposure potential from depleted uranium**
- **SC&A conducted classified documents review at DOE headquarters focused on earlier operations and systems containing DU**
- **SC&A conducted classified interviews with former Pantex workers with tenure to the early 1960s**
- **Some evidence of DU present after 1955, but no definitive information regarding exposure potential**
- **No evidence of gross contamination similar to W-28; interviewees did not have recollections of 1955-1957 period**
- **Further confirmation will require onsite research at Pantex**

## **Background for SC&A Review, 1984-1991**

- **Work Group deferred action for 1984-1991 pending further NIOSH assessment of whether 1989 bioassay data would be bounding for that specific W-28 “campaign” period**
- **1984-1989 represented peak years of W-28 disassembly**
- **Interviewee from that period noted that 1989 contamination event was not the worst one; just one that finally garnered management’s attention**
- **Bioassays for DU not routinely done until 1989 event; contamination control was lacking**
- **NIOSH claimed operations, exposure pathways, and controls would be more consistent and representative over 5 year campaign than in previous years**
- **SC&A awaits results of NIOSH’s review to begin its detailed assessment**